



Examiners' Report

Principal Examiner Feedback

June 2017

Pearson Edexcel International Advanced
Level in History (WHI04) Paper 1D

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Unit4: International Study with Historical Interpretations

WHI04 1D: The Cold War and Hot War in Asia, 1945-90

Introduction

June 1706 was the first time that WHI04 was taken by candidates entered for the IAL History qualification, and was the first time that candidates encountered AO3-focused questions relating to Historical Interpretations. It was pleasing to see that most candidates were well prepared in terms of knowledge and that many responses were both well-informed and well-written. However, the approach of some responses to both Section A and Section B limited the ability of candidates to be rewarded at the higher Levels of the mark scheme.

The paper is divided into two sections. Section A contains a compulsory question relating to the historical issue outlined in Key Topic 1 – Historical Interpretations. The question requires candidates to make a judgement on a stated viewpoint, through the analysis of two extracts from historical works which address the historical issue and their own knowledge of the historical issues. The question assesses AO3 skills - candidate ability to analyse and evaluate, in relation to the historical context, different ways in which aspects of the past have been interpreted - in combination with AO1 skills – candidate ability to demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts.

Section B also targets AO1 skills. Section B provides a choice of essays relating to Key Topics 2-4. Questions set may address more than one topic or relate to a single topic. The essays assess knowledge and understanding of the period in depth – questions may relate to a single event or a longer period – by targeting five possible second order concepts – cause, consequence, change/continuity, similarity/difference and significance. Questions may combine second order concepts, for example, consequence and change. Candidates answer one question from a choice of three. The most common weakness in Section B essays was the lack of a sharp focus on the precise terms of the question and/or the second order concept that was being targeted.

Candidates are, in general, clearly aware of both the structure and the timing of the examination paper; there was little evidence on this paper of candidates having insufficient time to answer questions from Sections A and B.

Candidate performance on each section and individual questions for Paper 2E is considered in the next section. Please note that it is recommended that centres look at a selection of Principal Examiner Reports from across the different routes of the paper to get an overall sense of examiner feedback, centre approaches and candidate achievement. It is also useful to take note of the indicative content in the mark schemes.

Centres may also wish to refer to the *Getting Started* guide that is to be found on the IAL History Pearson Edexcel website.

Section A

Unit 4 is the first time that candidates have encountered the AO3 skills requirement and most were aware of the need to address the viewpoint given in the question by analysing the interpretations presented in the extracts and drawing on their own knowledge. The viewpoint stated in the question will be represented clearly within one extract with counter-evidence being presented in the other. However, both extracts may include material which can be both compared as well as contrasted. Higher Level responses came to a judgement about how far they agreed with the viewpoint by analysing both extracts and integrating their own knowledge into the overall discussion. These responses often addressed the extracts from the beginning using them to discuss differing arguments in relation to the viewpoint and deploying own knowledge to expand the discussion and where appropriate indicate other areas of debate not covered. Higher Level responses also met the descriptor requirement to reach a judgement based on the views given in both extracts and did not just refer to the general lines of debate within the overall Key Topic area.

The generic mark scheme clearly indicates the three bullet-pointed strands which are the focus for awarding marks and centres should note their progression:

- interpretation and analysis of extracts
- deployment of knowledge of issues related to the debate
- evaluation of and judgement about the interpretations

Some approaches by candidates matched the descriptors in the lower Levels of the mark scheme. Candidates who wrote a Section B AO1 style answer without any explicit reference to the sources found it difficult to achieve a mark beyond low-Level 2 as all the bullet point descriptors require some engagement with the extracts. Also candidates who wrote responses almost entirely based on comprehension and understanding of the extracts rather than discussing the views presented in the extracts were unlikely to achieve beyond Level 2. Some responses wrote very briefly about each extract and then wrote extensively on aspects not included in the extracts. Again these responses were not using the extracts to develop the debate and so could at best reach low Level 3. A few candidates seemed to have a prepared response to a generalised debate with regard to the Key Topic which ignored the viewpoint given in the question altogether and so were not able to focus on the question set.

Some candidates viewed this as an AO2 source analysis and evaluated the extracts with regard to aspects of provenance which is not an appropriate approach. There may be some occasions when the title of the book from which the extract is taken furthers the discussion of the viewpoint but it is not intended that the candidates use the information provided to help forward the debate and no instruction is given with regard to this (unlike the AO2 requirements). Candidates should be encouraged to refer to the extracts and to discuss the interpretations to be found within the extracts. Here it is worth noting the guidance given in the *Getting Started* document. *Students are not expected to be familiar with the writing of the selected historians but they should be familiar*

with the issues that make the question controversial. Reference to the works of name historians, other than the material in the extracts provided is not expected but students may consider historians' viewpoints in framing their arguments.

Also many candidates appeared to create their discussion by reference to only the first few lines of each extract and so lost an opportunity to develop key points made later in the extracts. Candidates have sufficient time to consider the extracts carefully and to draw out a variety of different key points in order to compare and contrast the interpretations presented.

Overall, candidates for this Option were very well prepared and there were some interesting responses that were a pleasure to read.

Question 1

There were some excellent responses to this question. Most candidates were aware of the need to address the view stated in the question and to analyse the extracts in relation to this statement. The best responses were able to integrate own knowledge with key points raised in the extract and to come to a judgement in which both extracts were acknowledged. These responses also met the requirement to demonstrate understanding of the nature of historical debate. Most candidates were able to contrast the view in Extract 1 that China's entry into the war was triggered by the US invasion for the north with the view in Extract 2 that China's entry was as the result of a longer period of consideration timed from the decision of President Truman to send soldiers to Korea in July 1950. Candidates were able to use their own knowledge to discuss this and to develop key points within the extracts. Knowledge of Chinese diplomacy with the USSR during this period was used to good effect.

This is an example of a Level 5 response engaging with the extracts with an awareness of nature of historical debate.

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The justification for China's entry into the Korean War is ^{constantly} ~~often~~ disputed. ^{As seen} ~~Further~~ in Bragan's interpretation some schools of thought ~~view~~ ^{view} it to ^{the} U.S' exchange in war aims ~~and~~ ^{which} ~~invasion of Korea~~ which drew China into the war for reasons of self defense and loyalty. Alternatively, Frank's interpretation alludes to the already preparedness of China for eventual involvement as early as U.S troops were in Korea. Overall, it can be assumed China had multiple reasons for entry largely owing to self defense but also pressures from the USSR, North Korean loyalty and domestic affairs in China which ^{reveals} ~~makes~~ the newly formed Communist nation both had interests of self defense and opportunism - consolidating the already preexisting need to join the war ~~and~~ instead of "tragedy of"

Bragan's interpretation highlights the way China repeatedly warned U.S of ~~the~~ the consequence of the invasion of North Korea of

evident within "indicated plainly". This is justified by the knowledge that Mao repeatedly warned Truman of that if ~~the~~ U.S./UN/ROK forces were to be used on the Chinese border they would subsequently be forced to retaliate ~~this~~ ^{This} as the interpretation clearly states was a ~~matter~~ ^{matter} of the fear of U.S imperialism evident within "self-confident aggressor". ~~Summarizing Frank's~~ ~~right~~ Thus, China became fearful of U.S expansion only when U.S war aims ^{only} began to ~~change~~ ^{change} from containment to roll back ~~How~~ ^{How} ~~ever~~ ^{ever}, Frank is more convincing in suggesting that China was always prepared evident within "He ordered the PLA to begin troop deployments". This is supported by the evidence that Mao ~~sent~~ offered Kim troops in early 1950 yet Kim declined. Thus, it is more justified to suggest that the crossing of the ~~the~~ 38th parallel did not create the ~~desire~~ ^{the need} for Chinese involvement, but consolidated it, as a response from an accumulation of factors and American actions.

Another reason to suggest that China's entry into the Korean war was

not "triggered" by U.S invasion of North Korea which both extracts allude to is China's self defense interests. Brogan highlights that China was fearful they had to face "~~Chinese~~^{U.S} initiative elsewhere". China who had just united after years of civil war had interests to prevent U.S military ~~momentum~~ ^{activity in China} after military momentum that ~~gave~~ gave the U.S the confidence to advance into North Korea in the first place after the Inchon Landing.

Similarly Frank highlights China's fear ~~of~~ ^{that the} U.S ~~may~~ "sweep up to the Chinese border".

It is clear that China was "triggered" by the possibility to involve in the war before their entry into North Korea, and the invasion merely consolidated ~~China's~~ ^{China's} ~~border~~ fears. ~~and~~ This gave Mao who was having difficulty gaining consent from the Politburo to ^{a reason to become involved} become involved in the war. ~~What~~ What further consolidated the need for self defense was the remobilization of Japan who bordered China's industrial heartland of Manchuria. Thus, after World War II and the Sino-Japanese war for China to have overlooked the newly formed alliance of Japan and U.S is

as not a significant
~~not a threat would have~~ threat would have been
highly unlikely. Then, the crossing of the 38th parallel
did not impact "trigger" the entry of the war
as Frank's interpretation implies but consolidated
the security necessity of doing so.

~~And~~ China also would have been
triggered to enter the Korean war as
a part of ^{the} loyalty ~~not only~~ to the
greater Communist movement - ~~but also~~
to repay ^{Korea} for the support ^{they received}
during the Chinese war. ^{These are attitudes which would have predated}
^{in the crossing of the 38th parallel} Although, Brogan
seems to overlook Chinese entry as "not
simply" a problem of "losing face"
it is a vital reason ~~for~~ Frank's interpretation
alludes to this by ~~the~~ the fact it was one
step in a "process with much deeper roots"
potentially commenting on the great cold
war environment. It is known that Mao
was greatly influenced by the USSR to
send assistance to Korea and the USSR
provided both Chinese ^{supplies} and Korean
forces to fight with. Thus, it must
be recognized that once the U.S. entered the
war it technically became "internationalized"
and this ^{made} placed Korea ~~as~~ conflict apart
of the great cold war climate in which

NSC-68 ~~presented~~ ^{divided} the world as Communist and Capitalist. Then, suggestions in Frank's interpretation alludes to "military readiness in August 1950" and he first supports the idea that in this context attack from the West on Communism was ~~a threat~~ ^{a threat} to the strength of the ~~loss~~ rise of Communism both in Asia and in Europe. Thus, the crossing of the 38th parallel into North Korea did not "trigger" China's entry but consolidated the need to protect ^{North} Korea as a member of the greater "Communist Monolithic Bloc". On behalf of the USSR, and for Chinese ideological protection

~~Moreover~~ ^{Moreover}, it can be recognised that the security threats posed by the USA also predated the crossing of the 38th parallel and this expansion of war consolidated fears and the necessity to enter rather than created them.

Although Brogan's interpretation suggests that the U.S invasion of North Korea was "intolerable" other actions by the U.S particularly by MacArthur demonstrated the necessity to enter the war. This nets back to the "deep roots" which Frank alludes to. After the North Korean crossing of the 38th parallel Truman responded by sending the 7th fleet

to the Taiwan ^{strait} ~~states~~ and MacArthur publicly
praised Jiang Jieshi. This ~~demonstrated~~ ^{was} ~~in~~ ^{enquired}
to China a reintegration into the Chinese
civil war and allies such as Britain also
criticised this ^{policy} as provocative. This serves
to further give credit to Franklin's interpretation
who alludes to China's military preparedness
which predated the Crossing of the 38th
parallel. This, although as Brogan's interpretation
suggests that the U.S advance into Korea
demonstrated potential issues for China,
these were already fears that China was
aware of and thus the U.S advance did not
"trigger" Chinese entry but consolidated its
necessity.

Furthermore, it must be recognised that China's
entry into the war was also potentially an
example of opportunism for the newly formed
Communist state. Brogan's interpretation highlights
the role China thought it could play "
the moment to avert a Third World War"
This demonstrates the way China was also
seeking to gain prestige by challenging the
west. This is a prospect which the crossing
by UN/US/ROK ^{forces} opened up but not
something which ~~was~~ ^{would} have been overlooked.

By this time as well China and USSR were already facing tensions due to the ideological conflicts surrounding the interpretation of Marx and thus USSR were worried North Korea would turn to ~~them~~^{Mao} instead of Stalin for Communist influence. Moreover, China after experiencing years of war and turmoil perhaps saw the Korean War as a method to unify the country and some historians go as far to say it allowed Mao to consolidate his oppressive regime. This thus further supports Frank's interpretation that China did not overlook the U.S. threat in the Korean War and were only triggered off and advance but in fact suggests that the crossing and operation on the Chinese borders gave Mao a justification and reasoning to cement China on the "world stage" and gain prestige as both a protector of communism and a force able to halt the U.S. Subsequently, this is what did happen, the world was impressed by China's ability to halt the U.S. in their attempts at roll back. This, Hagers interpretation is limited in the sense it does not acknowledge the political climate or allusion motives of the world power of the time. This once again the U.S. invasion of North Korea did not

"tragedy" China's involvement but justified her entry as a part of a great political opportunity: to gain prestige and consolidate power.

In conclusion, although Brogan is justified in the respect it acknowledges the evidence which highlights China's supposed unwillingness to enter the war unless North Korea was threatened however faint to recognize the great cold war climate which made Chinese entry inevitable and moreover the opportunity in Korea war provided. In this respect Frank is more convincing in the way he acknowledges Chinese awareness of U.S. actions and the security threats predated the North Korea invasion. Moreover, Brogan although not explicitly does suggest it was an accumulation of actions not only one which consolidated China's need to enter the war. Overall, Chinese entry into the war was not triggered by the invasion of North Korea, but consolidated in the sense it affirmed security threats, the need to protect Communism and of course demonstrated and opportunity to reinsert itself onto the world stage.

Thus, the crossing of 38th parallel into China did not "trigger" Chinese entrance but consolidates the necessity both domestically and politically to do so.

Section B

Most candidates were clearly aware of the requirements for the essay skills assessed in Section B. Most candidates showed progression from the AS units and were well-prepared to write, or to attempt, an analytical rather than a descriptive response. There was little evidence to suggest that the range and depth of essays were affected by the time taken to consider the two extracts in Section A. Many candidates were able to access Levels 3, 4 and 5 but weaker responses either did not provide enough factual support for a depth study essay or deal well with the conceptual focus of the question. Centres are reminded that any of the second order concepts listed in the introduction can be addressed in the essay section and candidates need to be aware that not all questions will refer to causation and that not all responses require a main factor/other factors response. Indeed, a persistent number of candidates attempt to respond to all questions by addressing the relative significance of generic causal factors whether appropriate or not.

The generic mark scheme clearly indicates the four bullet-pointed strands which are the focus for awarding marks and centres should note their progression:

- analysis and exploration of key features and characteristics of the period in relation to the second-order conceptual demands of the question
- selection and deployment of knowledge
- substantiated evaluation and judgement
- organisation and communication of argument

At Level 4 and above there is a requirement for the exploration of key issues by an analysis of the relationships between key features of the period and many good responses remained in Level 3 because these relationships were stated rather than explained or because key features were addressed separately e.g. stating that each key feature in turn was the main reason rather than developing a logical argument. It is also important to note that the reference to valid criteria in the third bullet point is not a reference to the different factors/key issues/key features being discussed but to the measurement criteria being used to reach an overall judgement. This is the extent to which students are able to explain and justify their decision to ascribe greater significance to one cause than another, or to judge a development as significant or an action as ineffective etc.

Question 2

There were some excellent responses to this question deploying detailed knowledge of the policies of the two presidents. Some argued that they were indeed very similar in their determination to prevent the spread of communism in South East Asia while others argued that Kennedy ultimately increased the US presence in Vietnam and interfered in domestic policy more overtly. A few candidates just described the policies of the two without analysing similarity and difference. Also a few unfortunately mistook Eisenhower for Kennedy or compared the policies of Kennedy and Johnson. It is very important that candidates have knowledge of both the chronology and specific dates of the American presidential policies.

This is an example of a Level 2 response. It provides some attempt at analysis but mainly describes US policies and is not always accurate or secure. At times it seems to be answering a different question and there is no clear judgement. It attempts to outline some key features of the focus of the question.

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President Eisenhower was the US president from 1953 to 1961. He was in office during the Franco-Vietnam war from 1946 to 1953.

President Kennedy was the US president from 1961 to 1963, before he was assassinated in Houston, Texas.

During this time, the US was helping South Vietnam by sending military aid and food and medicine. The US wanted to prevent the spread of communism from ~~the~~ North Vietnam that was led by Ho-Chi Minh.

South Vietnam was under the rule of ~~the~~ ^{Nguyen} Diem, an anti-communist nationalist who favored the US. Diem was brought into power by ex-emperor Bao-Dai. Bao-Dai wanted Diem to be in power because he was popular among the citizens and favored the US. ~~The~~ Diem was appointed as Prime Minister.

President Eisenhower wanted to stop the flow of communism, so he sent aid to South Vietnam. However South Vietnam's government was corrupt and constantly asked for US aid. The US had to spend millions of dollars in order to aid South Vietnam. It took 14% of the US GNP ~~to~~ to help South Vietnam.

During the Franco-Vietnam war, the French asked for US aid because they didn't have sufficient troops and resources.

The French's economy was devastated after the second World War, so they depended on Vietnam's exports, in order to restore the French economy. This ~~is~~ is the main reason why France was unwilling to let Vietnam become an independent state.

North Vietnam sent the NLF to fight against the French. France triggered the war when they sent troops to ~~the~~ Vietnam's northern borders, where they ~~later~~ tried to stop the flow of weapons entering

North Vietnam. This caused thousands of innocent deaths, which ~~to~~ caused the Franco-Vietnam war. The French and US troops were unfit for Vietnam's climate as it was hard to find the enemy.

North Vietnam sent the NLF to fight against the French. The NLF is the National Labour Front, ~~the~~ North Vietnam's army. They had the advantage because they ~~are~~ were adapted to the environment that was hot and humid and filled with many jungles and mountains.

~~The~~ North Vietnam was receiving aid from China and the USSR. It would've been impossible for North Vietnam to win the war without their help. China and the USSR sent ammunitions and military aid. China allowed the NLF to hide in their southern borders as well.

President Eisenhower's policies were to stop the spread of communism while getting rid of the NLF. The NLF went to South Vietnam to help the

people by giving them food and assistance. This ~~was~~ had a major propaganda effect, so it made the majority of South Vietnamese to follow Ho - Chi Minh's ideals.

President Eisenhower was aware of ~~South~~ Diem's corrupt government but he didn't do anything because he wanted to stay neutral.

The US wanted to stay neutral but pressure from Europe caused the US to help France.

The US had a conflict of Pro - European factors and Pro - Asian factors. The Pro - European factors wanted the US to help France, while the Pro - Asian factors wanted the US to stay neutral.

The US eventually listened to the Pro - European factors because France was an important ally. France was important because they blocked communism from spreading in Europe.

The US was busy with the USSR because

of the Cold War, so they couldn't lose ~~a~~ a valuable ally. Thus the US helped France and provided aid to Diem.

Even though the US was sending aid to South Vietnam, it wasn't helping ~~the~~ South Vietnam. It was because Diem exploited the resources from the US. The aids and resources were distributed among the ~~high~~ top officials, so the villagers didn't receive any benefits.

Even if the villagers received US aids, it wasn't enough to help them. Famine and poverty heavily affected the villagers in South Vietnam. They started to resent ~~the~~ Diem's government because they weren't receiving help. They only received very little of the distribution, so they resented Diem's government.

~~Kennedy~~ President Kennedy's policies were to withdraw US troops from South Vietnam. ~~on~~ The continuation of sending US troops and resources were unpopular in the states because ~~the~~

~~citizens~~ it was wasting the citizen's money and resources. They were against Vietnam aid because they were helping a foreign country when they could improve the US.

President Kennedy was aware of the waste of resources, so he too wanted to ~~stop~~ withdraw US troops. However the top officials in the US were against this idea because they were making a profit out of it. There were many officials in Vietnam so they would lose their job if they were to leave Vietnam, thus they didn't like Kennedy's policies.

President Kennedy sent troops to South Vietnam to stop the spread of communism. He even sent aid to the French to help them. President Kennedy was adamant of preventing the flow of communism. So he was reluctant of ~~reunite~~ Vietnam ~~to be~~ re-unification.

Dien's government didn't want re-unification because they were anti-

communist, so they preferred the US aid.

Ho - Chi Minh, ~~wanted~~ ^{the} leader of North Vietnam wanted to re-unify North Vietnam with South Vietnam but it was impossible during that time due to French influence and South Vietnam's reluctance to re-unification.

So he sent ~~the~~ the NLF to South Vietnam to gain intel and help the villagers.

While Eisenhower's policies wanted to maintain neutrality, Kennedy's policies wanted to prevent the flow of communism.

Overall, the two president's policies ~~aren't similar~~ are similar because they sent aid to South Vietnam. They sent troops and resources in order to stop the flow of communism. They also favoured the French over the Vietnamese by providing continuous support to the French.

Their policies didn't benefit ~~either~~ North Vietnam and South Vietnam

because all the aids went to the top officials. There was resentment towards Diem's government in Eisenhower and Kennedy's regime. There was no Vietnam re-unification plans as well, so their policies are similar.

Question 3

Again, there were some excellent and thought-provoking answers to this question. Candidates were generally knowledgeable and analytical in their responses. Some argued that the negative affect on public support was the most significant because of the connection to most of the other consequences while others argued that the most significant consequence was the impact on American policy in Vietnam and/or American military strategy. A few responses merely described or explained the consequences of the given factor without considering 'other' consequences. Most candidates were aware of the physical failure of the Tet Offensive but the psychological damage that it did to US involvement in the war. The best responses were able to measure significance by addressing the impact of the Tet Offensive and considering the difference that it made to the various aspects of US involvement.

This is a Level 5 response. It provides a sustained analysis, sufficient knowledge and reaches a justified conclusion supporting the argument made.

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Chosen question number: **Question 2** **Question 3**

The Tet offensive of 1968 is often cited as being the turning point of the war in Vietnam, in that it heightened public opposition while also serving as another demonstration that the US could not feasibly win the war that they had entered. The Tet offensive caused mass outrage, in part due to the media, which heightened opposition for the subsequent 5 years of the war. However, the offensive also had other lasting impacts, ~~such as~~ its impact on military performance as well as how it affected the political policies of the war up until 1973 when the armistice was agreed. However, in both other major consequences, it can be traced back to the public opposition which created the military failure as well as political desperation, which would thus reinforce the idea that the impact on public support was the most significant consequence of the Tet offensive.

Although before the offensive there was public opposition such as a 6000 person protest at Yale and a 25,000 march on Washington, opposition to the war was still a ~~small~~ minority, and the vast majority of Americans still supported the war. However, in 1968 the Tet offensive stirred all kinds of domestic unrest. A huge reason for this is due to its impact on perception. Beforehand, most Americans believed they were winning, which made the military ~~humiliating~~ humiliation at Tet all the more damaging. One prominent journalist named Walter Cronkite summarized this ~~shock~~ shock in "What the hell is going on over there? I thought we were winning the war!" The ~~factor~~ is increasingly significant as it reinforces the shift in the view

of the media which played a large part in shaping public opinion. The 1955 shark was significant that it led Johnson to say "If I've lost Cronkite, I've lost America" from 1968 onwards, the opposition to the war increased massively in scale. For example, in 1971 there was a 250,000 person march on Washington, ~~a tenth of the size~~ ^{ten times the size} from less than a decade before. ~~For~~ More notably however is from the change in Johnson's approval rating, which fell to under 36%. The significance of Tet is therefore huge as through the creation of massive public upheaval, it could be said that this made a victory impossible as the presidents (Johnson and Nixon) lacked the support needed to ensure a victory for the US. However, it could be argued that Tet did not create opposition, but rather allowed it to grow. In the years up to Tet, there was increasing public opposition, which was merely highlighted and added to by Tet, which was seen as another demonstration of the futility of the US involvement in Vietnam. However, the change in attitude of the media could also suggest ~~that the~~ that the event did in fact change the views of the public, from a mostly supportive to a mostly opposed public.

However, it cannot be said that public opposition was the largest consequence without considering other effects. The Tet offensive arguably demonstrated to the US and the world that the war in a purely military sense could not be won, and caused a re-evaluation of failed US military operations to try and regain some advantage. During the offensive, thousands of Viet Cong guerrillas moved undetected through south Vietnam and coordinated an attack on several key areas, which although failing to retake Vietnam did cause over 5000 deaths as well as one more

Showing that the US could not effectively fight the tactics of the Vietnamese Guerrillas. The impact on the military was multi-faceted. On one hand, it damaged the psychology of the US troops who suffered decreased morale at this military disaster. Separately however, the battle showed the army the futility of their interventions as they failed to prevent or effectively defend the attack. The longer term impact of Tet was quite significant. In order to regain the confidence of the public and the army, the US attempted a series of operations to regain advantage, all of which failed. For example, the bombing of the Ho Chi Minh trail can be seen as a desperate attempt to combat the Viet Cong's Viet Cong's style of guerrilla warfare. However, all this ~~and~~ the bombing failed to have any significant impact, as well as creating further Viet Cong sympathy. Similarly, the Christmas bombing can be seen as further demonstration of US desperation to ~~win~~ gain back confidence following the Tet offensive, yet this bombing of Hanoi provided nothing as well as unnecessarily harming civilians. Overall, Tet had a significant impact on the military performance. On one level, it created a morale problem. More than this, it created a kind of military desecration as the US tried to gain victories, yet achieved nothing. Finally, the offensive showed once more that the Guerrillas could not be defeated, thus creating the ~~situation~~ ~~of~~ the public war. However, all of this military failure could be argued as being an extension of public opposition. As the offensive failed, the government was desperate to quash dissent by providing victories, which just caused further failures. In this sense, it can still be argued that the biggest ~~cause~~ consequence of Tet was how it irreparably altered the perception and attitude of the US public for the rest of the war, which ultimately led to the ~~defeat~~ or armistice that

of mutual withdrawal, which was denied to them, leading to Nixon deciding that this was not renewed, even to the extent of allowing VC troops to remain in south Vietnam even after the US withdrawal. Similarly, the US were forced to ~~cancel~~ call bombing. This power of the Vietnamese during the negotiations can be said to be a result of their overriding level of superiority which culminated in the Tet offensive, which placed them in a position of relative power. However, the ~~US~~ significance of Tet on negotiations is somewhat undetermined due to the US' ~~US~~ America's persistence that they remain in power which was eventually agreed upon. However, they were forced to accept a coalition, recognizing the power and authority of the Vietnamese commands, another major concession. Although Tet did directly necessitate negotiations due to its demonstration of the futility of the war, it ~~did also force us~~ could also be argued that even the necessity of negotiating was enough to show it affected public perception. Following Tet, the belief that the war should be ended grew, with 49% of people favouring being in 1968. Similarly, Nixon's ~~low~~ approval reached as low as 40%, further creating a need for an end of the war if he was to regain any degree of popularity. This would thus reinforce the idea that the most significant consequence of the 1968 Tet offensive was how it irreversibly lowered public support for the war itself.

To conclude, although ~~as~~ the Tet offensive can be seen as a significant turning point in the Vietnam war due to how it affected several aspects of the war. The offensive instantly lowered the public

support, is not due to its coverage by the media, which created the overall sentiment of futility and thus caused civil unrest. However, the offensive had other detrimental effects as well. The offensive served as another demonstration of the US military ineptitude and comparative Viet Cong strength, who could easily outmaneuver the US due to their local knowledge and support. However, this in turn led to several desperate attempts to assert strength, all of which failed to achieve anything, leading to desert. However, this could be argued as being an extension of public disillusion, as these military blunders were in attempt of regaining support. Another impact of the offensive was how it necessitated negotiations, as well as many significant concessions. The Tet showed the futility of the war which led Nixon to enter peace talks, as well as forcing him to concede on key issues as the Vietnamese possessed the power due to their strength. However, this also serves as a reminder of the significant media support, as Nixon only entered talks to appease the public outcry which stemmed from the failure of Tet. Overall, it can therefore be said that the most significant consequence of Tet was how it irreparably lowered the level of support for the war, which in turn caused the desert and armistice.

This Level 4 response does engage with the question and explore key features but there are limitations which means that it meets the Level 4 rather than the Level 5 descriptors.

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Plan - Tet

Negative impact on public opinion, ^{VC guerrillas - public quote} Walker Cronkite

SDS movement - Black power augmented / Gallup polls

But silent majority etc

Negative impact militarily but bill ratio

Negative impact for congressional support e.g LBJ

but this was arguably pre-Tet.

Conclusion paved the way for withdrawal.

The Tet Offensive of 1968 was had a very negative effect on public support for the war, augmenting support for the anti-war movement (AWM). However, perhaps its greatest effect was on congress, personified by LBJ not resubmitting his candidacy for reelection creating an initial shock which set in place the policy of de-Americanisation, or withdrawal.

Nevertheless, the first and most significant consequence was growing discontent for the war which was triggered by Tet. The image of VC guerrillas surrounding the US embassy in Saigon was a propaganda triumph for the North Vietnamese forces. This image was to be portrayed nationwide or spurring discussion about the war.

Famously, Walter Cronkite said "What the hell is going on? I thought we were winning the war!" The impact of the widely respected TV anchorman is emphasised by LBJ's statement "if we lose Cronkite, we lose America" and the significance of public opinion shown through LBJ's - "public opinion is the weakest link in our armour". Indeed, Public opinion was very pivotal and Tet portrayed increasing discontent. An opinion poll highlighted ^{70%} ~~many~~ had felt there had been no progress made in Vietnam since 1965. In addition, a Gallup poll indicated 20 per cent had switched to opposing the war. The anti-war ~~movement~~ sentiment was greatly increased with growing SDS protests (200,000 marched on New York in 1969) and further support for ^{the} Black Power movement. This ^{negative} public support for the war would serve to erode congressional support too. Hence, with a great deal of the population switching to opposing the war, it is accurate to say the most significant effect of Tet was negative public opinion for the war.

However, on the other hand, one could argue that that there was not a great deal of negative support for war as a consequence of Tet. Although 20% switched to opposing the war, they were still the minority (3:1). This would be highlighted by Nixon's ^{stent} majority speech in ~~October~~ ^{November} 1969 which highlighted 69 per cent

still supported the war. Also, public opinion did not impact presidential thinking. An opinion poll ascertained that the AWM was regarded as "more offensive than the war itself." Therefore, while the Tet offensive did spark greater public backlash to the war, negative public opinion did not heavily impact on presidential thinking and policies. In this way the negative public opinion effect on public support was a consequence, but not a significant one.

Perhaps what had more of a significant consequence, was the Tet offensive's effect on US military. The Tet exposed the military's failings greatly - both to congress and the public. Firstly, it portrayed the weakness of US counter-intelligence which had been focussing on the Khe Sanh offensive. Moreover, it emphasised the USA's weakness to guerrilla tactics. Although there was considerable success in the war itself - Westmoreland ~~claimed the~~ proclaimed of the favourable 10:1 kill ratio - and mini-tet and Tet III were complete failings - it showed there was much more to winning the war than a single military victory. It highlighted it was a military failing because despite success in battles, the number of VC insurgents was actually growing. This was due to the various bombing runs which negatively impacted south Vietnamese support for the American-sponsored government. Thus, the a significant consequence of Tet was that it

it signified small victories over the VC were not enough to stop its growing support and because the US could not stop present fostering support, the Tet accentuated this great problem. Hence a significant consequence of ^{the} Tet Offensive was that it elucidated ~~the~~ the USA's military failing to stop VC support.

What I believe to be the most significant ~~off~~ consequence of the Tet offensive was its impact on congressional support for the war. Post-Tet, LBJ significantly decided to not resubmit his candidacy for reelection. He simply could not sustain a hard and bitter policy - his Great Society program stalled of each due to the growing budget deficit as a result of the Tet offensive (1.6 billion in 1965 - 25.3 billion in 1968 after Tet). It ~~set in place the~~ ^{created the} initial shock which set in place the policy of de-Americanization, or gradual withdrawal from Vietnam. This erosion of support for the war was felt through all the echelons of US government and was a leading factor in negative private/political congressional support for the war. In this way, the most significant consequence of the Tet Offensive was not its effect on public opinion, but its effect on congressional opinion to the war.

Arguably, however, this erosion of congress was occurring

Pre-Tet. In 1967, 12 ~~senate~~ senators openly opposed the war (but more had serious doubts in private). Moreover, LBJ lost support from his 'wise men'. Fulbright and Kennan (one of the early advocates openly of containment) opposed the war before Tet in 1967. Moreover, James M. Levin, a senior advisor, argued the financial cost was simply too high. Hence the significance of Tet in affecting congressional thinking may be minute, as erosion of support for the war began pre-tet.

To conclude, it is certain that the Tet offensive negatively affected public opinion. However, this was not its most significant consequence. While military failings were significant too, it was neither this, nor public opinion which was its main consequence. Ultimately, the Tet offensive's most significant consequence was that it was a catalyst for US congressional opposition to the war, and most importantly a leading causal factor in breaking the 'commitment trap' faced by successive US presidents as it led to withdrawal. Therefore, the most significant effect and consequence of the Tet offensive was that it led to US withdrawal from South East Asia.

Paper Summary

Based on their performance on this paper, candidates are offered the following advice:

Section A

- Candidates should use the time available to read and consider both extracts carefully before planning their answer

- Candidates should read the question carefully and make sure that they address the view specifically stated in the question
- Candidates should aim to interpret both extracts by analysing the issues raised and showing an understanding of the arguments presented by both authors
- Candidates should aim to integrate own knowledge with the key points raised in the extracts.

Section B

- Spending a few minutes planning helps to ensure the second order concept is correctly identified
- Candidates must provide more precise contextual knowledge as evidence. Weaker responses lacked depth and sometimes range
- Candidates should avoid a narrative-descriptive approach; this undermines the analysis that is required for the higher levels
- Candidates need to be aware of key dates as identified in the specification so that they can address the questions with chronological precision
- Candidates should try to explore the links between issues in order to make the structure of the response flow more logically and to enable the integration of analysis.

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